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trade deficits that only recently have begun to
subside.
These trends present an incomplete picture of
the sectoral composition of output, however, be-
cause they combine real output and relative price
effects. A decline in the nominal value of output
in a given sector may result from either afall in
the real volume of output or from a decline in the
relative price of that output. Chart 2 shows the














Some suggest that the dramatic decline inex-
ports and expansion of imports intensified a
longer term trend of "deindustrialization" of the
u.S. economy. Beyond trade statistics, these ana-
lysts cite as evidence in support of this view data
that indicate a declining share of manufactures in
total GNP. In particular, they point to the secular
decline in manufacturing's share of nominal out-
put over the last thirty years and the concomitant
rise in the share held by services, which include
retail and wholesale trade, real estate, insurance,
and financial services. (See Chart 1.) Except dur-
ing the 1970s, moreover, the output ofagricul-
ture, mining, and forestry product industries also
has fallen as a share ofnominal GNP.
There is a perception that the sharp appreciation
in the value of the dollar between 1982 and 1985
played a major role in "deindustrializing" the
u.S. economy. Many analysts argue that the ap-
preciation of the dollar caused economic growth
to be "two-tiered." The manufacturing and other
industries that faced stiff international competi-
tion experienced slow growth or even decline,
but the sectors of the economy that were less
sensitive to changes in the value of the dollar,
such as services, construction, and transport, ex-
perienced stronger growth. It is now hoped that
the dollar depreciation over the past three years
will restore the fortunes of the sectors that were
hurt by its appreciation. This Letter examines
recent and longer term trends in U.s. manufac-
turing output and discusses the evidence con-
cerning the link between exchange rate changes
and sectoral output levels.
Analysts have welcomed the dollar's depreciation
in the foreign exchange market over the past
three years as a source oflong-overdue relief for
u.s. firms competing with foreign producers in
domestic and world markets. Indeed, recent u.s.
trade data show that u.s. export growth in vol-
ume terms has been surging during the past
year and u.s. import growth has been declining
sharply. In addition to its beneficial effects on the
trade balance, some policymakers and analysts
also are hoping that the dollar's fall will breathe
new life into America's industrial sector.
Sectoral output trends
The decline of u.s. exports and surge in imports
during the first half of the 1980s dramatically
illustrates the loss of u.s. international competi-
tiveness earlier in this decade. The total volume
of u.s. exports fell more than 15 percent during
the six years from 1980 to 1986, while import
volume grew over 60 percent. The export volume
of manufactures remained flat from 1980 to 1984
and rose by only four percent between 1984 and
1986. Imports of manufactures rose by 125 per-
cent over the 1980 to 1986 period. The result,
of course, has been unprecedentedly large u.s.FRBSF
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This chart presents a substantially different pic-
ture from that provided by the trends in nominal
output shares. Although the upward trend in the
real share of services in GNP clearly is evident,
real manufactures has been remarkably stable at
roughly 21 percent of GNP over the past thirty
years through. several business cycle swings.
Moreover, no significantfall in the,share of real
manufactures has occurred since 1980. In con-
trast, the real output share of agriculture, mining,
and forestry products has shown a marked secu-
lar decline. The share of transportation, public
utilities, and construction in real GNP also has
shown a small secular decline.
The discrepancy between manufacturing's nom-
inal and real shares of output is due to a secular
decline in the relative price of manufactures. Be-
tween 1947 and 1986the relative price of manu-
factures declined by more than thirty percent.
Relative gains in manufacturing productivity over
the last 30 years account for this decline in rela-
tive prices. Thus, this evidence does not suggest
a decline in the share of manufactures in real ag-
gregate output, but rather a marked relative price
decline over a three-decade-Iong period. (For
more information, see the Letter by Brian Motley,
liThe Shift to Services:' January 16, 1987.)
Output levels and exchange rates
The stability in manufacturers' share of real
outputthrough the 1980s seems hard to recon-
cile with the .decline in manufacturing exports
following the appreciation of the dollar. Con-
ceivably, real exchange rate movements and the
level of manufacturing output are closely related
since these tvyo variables are both influenced by
domestic and foreign economic conditions, pol-
In fact, the observed relationship between ex-
change rates and sectoral output composition
over time has varied considerably. Systematic
investigation of real exchange rates and u.s.
manufacturing output over the post-war period,
holding oil price shifts and business cycle effects
constant, shows that during some periods, de-
clines in manufacturing output have been highly
correlated with exchange rate appreciation,
while at other times no significant link was iden-
tifiable. This suggests that although exchange rate
movements have powerful effects on exports and
imports, the effects on overall manufacturing and
u.s. industrycan.be ambiguous.
icies, and disturbances. However, the way in
which exchange rates and sectoral output are
related at any point in time is determined by
the nature of the underlying macroeconomic
changes. Depending on the changes in these
fundamental factors, an appreciation of the
exchange rate may be associated with an ex-
pansion or a contraction of output in different
sectors.
Several examples should help to demonstrate
how the relationship can vary. An independent
increase in foreign demand for U.s.-produced
manufactures would lead to a higher relative
price of u.s. manufactures, expanded industrial
production, and a real appreciation of the dollar.
The appreciation would dampen, but not offset,
the rise in exports that was stimulated by the in-
crease in foreign demand. In this case, then, a
real appreciation of the currency would be asso-
ciated with an expansion of the manufacturing
sector.
But such a positive correlation between ex-
change rates and manufacturing output is not the
only possible relationship. Consider a U.S. fiscal
expansion, which stimulates domestic demand
for u.s. goods, and causes a real dollar apprecia-
tion which, in turn, weakens exports, including
those of manufactures. Fiscal policies that stimu-
late non-manufactures, such as services, can ex-
acerbate the decline in manufacturing output. In
this case, the relationship between manufactur-
ing output and a dollar appreciation i.. ~ nega-
tive. On the other hand, fiscal policies that have
the effect of shifting aggregate demand towards
manufactures, will offset some ofthe decline
associated with the currency appreciation and
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Real Output Sharesoutput were offset by the stimulus to industrial
sectors from rising domestic military expendi-
tures.
The flip side of the coin is that currentand future
improvements in the federal budget deficit asso-
ciated with fiscal spending reductions and/or
tax increases will reduce aggregate demand, in-
cluding that for manufactures. But the resulting
decline in the dollar likely will continue to offset
a portion of this dampening effect by stimulating
exports.
Conclusions
Rumors of the "death" of manufactures or the
"deindustrialization" of America are greatly ex-
aggerated. Indeed, the share of manufactures in
real GNP has remained remarkably stable, at
roughly 21 percent, over the past 30 years. The
reason for the secular decline in manufactures'
share of nominal GNP is that the relative price of
manufactures has been falling overthisperiod.
Although the appreciation of the dollar hurt
exports of U.S. goods, including manufactures,
there is little evidence to support the view that
such appreciation fostered "deindustrialization:'
The expansion in fiscal policy that played a pri-
mary role in initiating the appreciation helped to
offset the deleterious effects of the appreciation,
particularly as government expenditures shifted







The combination of weak exports, stable man-
ufacturing output shares, and dollar appreciation
between 1982 and 1985 are the result of this pol-
icy mix, which provided overall aggregate fiscal
stimulus and reoriented expenditures toward du-
rable manufactures. The appreciation ofthe dol-
lar hurt those industrial sectors most exposed to
international competition. These industries expe-
rienced declining export shares. However, the
adverse effects on the demand for manufacturing
ing sector. Here, the relationship between output
and exchange rates could range from mildly
negative to mildly positive, depending
on the extent to which the fiscal stimulus
offsets the unfavorable movement in the ex-
change rate.
Recent U.s. experience reflects the effects of
expansionary fiscal policies that have stimulated
demand for manufactured goods. In the first half
of the eighties, U.S. macroeconomic policy was
marked by the largest peacetime fiscal expansion
in the post-war period. A major component of
the fiscal expansion was significant tax reduc-
tions, but equally important was a reorientation
of federal government spending on goods and
services away from non-defense towards defense.
(Defense spending constituted 69 percent of total
federal spending on goods and services in 1980
and 77 percent in 1984.) Moreover, within the
category of defense expenditures, spending
shifted towards hardware procurement. As a re-
sult, defense absorbed a larger percentage of
total demand for U.S. durable goods manufac-
tures, rising from seven percent in 1980 to almost
11 percent in 1984.
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